Commentary of The College of Coimbra:

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

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Tab 1

Nicomachean Ethics

Disputations from the Conimbricenses

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PREFACE

That no one can become a perfect Philosopher without being imbued with the precepts of Moral Science is plainly indicated both by that well-known division by which the Ancients distributed Philosophy into Dialectic, Natural, and Moral; and also because, just as for living well and blessedly, so also for philosophizing correctly, one must perceive what is honorable, what is base; what is to be embraced and what to be fled — the knowledge of which belongs properly to Moral Philosophy. Hence, for those engaged in the curriculum of the liberal arts, this doctrine — which cannot be fully and completely explained to those who are tending toward other things — is customarily and ought to be taught at least in part.

That this might be conveniently preserved, we judged it worthwhile to compose certain

disputations in which we would gather together, reduced to order and summary, the more important things among those that have been treated in scattered fashion by Aristotle in the books of the *Ethics to Nicomachus*.

We have omitted — as we did in the books on *Meteorology* and *Parva Naturalia* — interpretation of the Aristotelian text: not because we think it should be neglected, but because we weigh not what has been written by others, nor what could be written by us, but what can be set forth for students of Philosophy within the fixed span of years allotted to them.

Therefore, the purpose and end of Moral Science is to teach the manner of living honorably, to form character through uprightness of conduct, and to lead one to the happy state of life. And because the human being, who in this manner can be formed and shaped, is viewed either in himself without reference to the multitude — to which he otherwise belongs, since he is a political animal — or as part of the domestic community, or as a kind of member of the whole Republic: from this it results that this science contains three parts: Ethics or Monastics, Economics or Family science, and Politics or Civil science.

Of these, the first orders the character of the human being considered in himself absolutely; the second hands down domestic discipline and instructs in the governance of one's own household; the third establishes the best Republic and directs the human being so that he properly carries out those things that pertain to the condition of the whole kingdom and the universal good.

The subject of all Moral Science (which can now easily be gathered from what has been said) is the human being insofar as he acts freely and insofar as he can be cultivated by good morals and obtain human happiness: understood in such a way, however, that the consideration of it encompasses that threefold variety of which we spoke a little earlier.

Of its three parts, Ethics leads the rest in order of doctrine and dignity: because it treats of a simpler matter — namely the formation of the human being according to himself — which is something simpler than the family, which coalesces from individual human beings, and the kingdom, which coalesces from individual families and cities. Likewise, because it is necessary to order one's own life before approaching the helm of family or

Republic. Therefore Aristotle, at the beginning of the *Ethics to Nicomachus*, employed a certain proem common to all Moral doctrine; and at the end of that same work he promised to dispute, as he went on, both concerning the Republic and concerning the rationale for making laws.

ON THE MORAL BOOKS OF ARISTOTLE, AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE ETHICS TO NICOMACHUS

While the ancient Philosophers were occupied solely in the investigation and science of natural things, Socrates — as Xenophon testifies in his book on Socrates' sayings, and Cicero in the first *Academica* — is said to have first turned the study of philosophizing toward the ordering of life, calling down from the sky that discipline which concerns conduct and placing it in cities and homes.

On which subject his most distinguished disciples, Plato and Aristotle, then wrote many excellent things.

Of Plato's works there survive certain Dialogues dealing with private matters, such as *Memnon*, *Euthyphro*, *Philebus*, *Crito*; and others dealing with public matters, such as the *Laws* and the *Republic*.

Aristotle embraced all parts of this doctrine in various works — approximately 178 books in all. Of these there have come down to us, on Ethics: ten books *To Nicomachus*, seven *To Eudemus*, two called *Magna Moralia* (that is, the great Moral works); on domestic discipline: two books called *Economics*; on governing the Republic: eight books called *Politics*.

Leaving the rest aside for the present — as regards the books of the *Ethics to Nicomachus*, from which those things we have assembled in these disputations are drawn in large part — it is to be noted that there is no little disagreement about their author. For Cicero in the fifth book *On Ends* suspects they were composed by Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle. In favor of this opinion, which others have followed, the very inscription of the work gives support. For they are called *Ēthikōn Nikomacheiōn* — that is, *Moral works of Nicomachus*. These words seem not obscurely to signify that they are Nicomachus's, that is, written by Nicomachus.

Yet it must be maintained, by the common judgment of interpreters and others, that such books are Aristotelian: as is attested by the consistency of doctrine, the brevity and weight of the sentences, the keenness of arguments, the texture of the diction, and the whole manner of instruction. Also, because at the end of this work the author refers the reader to his books on the Republic, or the *Politics*, and in the sixth book, third chapter, to his *Analytics* — works that are clearly Aristotelian. Therefore these books are called "Nicomachean" not because they were composed by Nicomachus, but because they are Nicomachus's — that is, inscribed to Nicomachus and given as a gift of paternal love.

This work is distributed into ten books. In the first, the end to which human actions are directed is treated. In the second, virtues in general. In the third, the principles of honorable actions — in which the explanation of the individual virtues also begins. In

the fourth, the treatment of those same virtues is continued. In the fifth, Justice is discussed. In the sixth, the five habits of the intellect. In the seventh, Heroic virtue, Continence, and Incontinence. In the eighth, Friendship and its species. In the ninth, certain things pertaining to Friendship are handed down. In the tenth, Contemplative happiness is discussed.

DISPUTATION I: ON THE GOOD

Since the purpose of Moral Philosophy is to lead the human being to happiness — which happiness is a certain good and the ultimate end of human life — being about to treat shortly of happiness and of those things by which one arrives at it, we will first discourse on the Good and the End, but briefly and in passing. For we have written copiously on the End and its multiplicity and causal force in the *Physics*, and we shall treat the Good ex professo in the fourth book of *Metaphysics*. And in order to begin from the definition of the good, we ask:

Question I:

Whether the Good is rightly defined as "that which all things desire"?

ARTICLE I: That it seems not to be rightly defined.

In the first chapter of the first book of the *Ethics*, Aristotle commended that definition of the Good handed down by the Ancients: *The Good is that which all*

things desire. Yet there are those who approve of it less; with the most powerful argument that the human being desires not only good things but also base and evil things.

And so they prefer the definition whose author is said to be Diogenes the Stoic, namely: *The Good is that which is perfect according to nature* — which Cicero also embraces in the third book *On Ends*, and Simplicius in the fifth chapter of the *Enchiridion*. And Plotinus (*Enneads* VI, book 7, chapter 19) holds that the Good should be defined as "participation in the first Good, which is good of itself."

ARTICLE II: The proposed definition of the Good is approved and explained.

Yet there is no reason for us to reject that ancient definition, which the common consent of the Peripatetic school has embraced. But for a fuller understanding of it, we must here take up what we shall expound more fully elsewhere — namely, that the good, as good, signifies in its formal reason (though others think otherwise) a relation of suitability: since the good is the object of appetite, and each thing is desired insofar as it is suitable or is thought to be suitable. Now suitability is followed by desirability as a proper property — as visibility follows color. For just as color is the foundation of visibility, so the good is the foundation of desirability. Therefore if the good is viewed in its own formal reason, it will be defined as *that which is suitable to each thing*; but if it is considered according to its properties

— one of which is desirability — it will rightly be described as *that which is desirable by all*, or (which comes to the same thing) *that which all things desire*. From which it is now clear that the proposed definition of the Good is apt and fitting: though it has been handed down not *a priori* but *a posteriori*, as St. Thomas has noted.

ARTICLE III: With what appetite do all things desire the good?

Here someone might ask: with what appetite do all things desire the good? For this, know that appetite is either innate or elicited.

Innate appetite is the inborn propensity by which each thing is inclined toward that which is suitable to it. This divides into three members: natural, sensitive, and intellectual.

Natural appetite is innate appetite by which a thing without any cognition is inclined toward that which is suitable to it. In this way not only is the appetite by which matter seeks form natural appetite, but also the power of understanding insofar as it is an inclination toward the intelligible; indeed even the faculty of willing, insofar as it is a propensity toward the willable, considered in itself without any operation.

Sensitive appetite is innate appetite by which a thing is carried toward the good suitable to it, with the cognition of sense going before. It is distributed into

the irascible and the concupiscible — of which more in due course.

Intellectual appetite is innate appetite by which a thing desires the good suitable to it, with the cognition of intellect going before: because appetite is nothing other than will.

Finally, elicited appetite is an act of desiring by which a power, with cognition going before, is carried toward its object. Of this kind are love, hope, desire, and the other affections of the soul of this sort, by which we are moved toward things proposed by intellect or sense.

From these things it will now be easy to respond to the proposed question: namely that the appetite by which all things desire the good is indiscriminately any one of those appetites we have enumerated. For as is clear from their very definition, all are carried toward the good — though not all in the same way, nor are all present in all things. For those things that lack cognition are endowed only with natural appetite; brutes with natural and sensitive; human beings with natural, sensitive, and intellectual.

Question II

Whether every appetite is directed toward the good?

Article I: Arguments by which the negative part seems to be shown.

In this dispute, to the negative part were inclined Gabriel (in *Sent.* II, d.6, q.1), Ockham (in *Sent.* III, d.q. and 13, ad q.3), Angelus (*Moralia*, cap.2) — and also others who assert that the will can desire evil as evil and repudiate good as good.

Article II: The affirmative part is concluded; and the arguments of the adversaries are dissolved.

Yet it must be maintained that every appetite tends toward the good: as Aristotle teaches (*Ethics* VIII, cap. 2; *Politics* I, cap. 1; *De Anima* III, cap. 10; *Topics* VI, cap. 4), St. Dionysius (*De Divinis Nominibus*, cap.4), St. Thomas (*Summa* I-II, q. 8, art. 1), Durandus (in I, d. 46, q. 2), Marsilius (in II, q. 16, art. 5), Buridan (*Ethics* III, q. 5), and others.

It is proved from the fact that the good is the object of appetite — and no power is directed except toward its proper object. Second: because the better any thing is, the more it draws others to love of it — which

plainly indicates that it is goodness that draws appetite to itself in any thing. Therefore, although the formal object of the will is the willable — just as the formal object of sight is the visible — yet the good, as it is distributed into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasant, extends no less widely than the willable or desirable. Hence it must be pronounced absolutely that the will can will nothing that does not attain some character of the good, whether true or apparent.

Question III:

On the Division of The Good in General

Article I: Various Divisions of Goods.

What things were to be counted among goods, and which goods excelled which, was a great debate in the schools of Philosophers: as is clear from what St. Augustine transmitted in the ninth book *On the City of God*, chapter 4; Cicero in *On Ends* and the first *Academica*; Seneca in the book entitled *That Injustice Cannot Befall the Wise Man*.

Leaving aside such controversies for the present, we will bring forward several divisions of goods that are more celebrated. Plato in the first book *On Laws* distributes goods into divine and human. The divine goods he said to be: prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude; the human: health, beauty, strength, riches. Aristotle in the first book of the *Ethics*, chapter 6, distributes the good into the ten Categories: substance, quantity, quality, etc. He and Plato in the third book *On Laws* teach that some goods are goods

of the soul, such as the virtues; others of the body, such as strength and health; others external, such as riches, fame, honor, dominion.

Article II: Division of the Good into the Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasant.

Besides the above divisions there is another, which Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.3), St. Ambrose (*On Offices*, cap.9), Cicero (fifth *Tusculan Disputations*), and other authors with common consent put forward: namely, into the good that is honorable, the useful, and the pleasant or delectable. The rationale of this division is explained by St. Thomas (I, q.5, art.6) roughly as follows: Each thing is called good insofar as it is desirable and as it terminates the motion — or quasi-motion — of the desiring faculty. Now motion is terminated simply at the ultimate end; and in a qualified sense at the medium by which one goes toward the ultimate. And the ultimate end, on the one hand, has the character of a thing desired for itself — and this is called the honorable good; on the other, of rest in the thing obtained — and this is called the pleasant good. The medium tends toward the ultimate end as the useful, and is so named. Yet it sometimes happens that one and the same thing, under diverse consideration, is honorable, useful, and delectable — as the love of God, which in itself is an honorable action, is useful for obtaining beatitude, and is practiced with the pleasure of the soul.

DISPUTATION II: ON THE END

Question I

Whether the End and the Good are the Same?

Article I: Discussion of the question on both sides

After the treatment of the Good, it follows that we dispute on the End. And first the negative side of the controversy is shown: because the good, as good, signifies a relation of suitability; but the end, as end, imports a relation of final causality. Hence the good is defined as *that which is suitable*, and the end as *that for the sake of which the rest are done*.

Second, because the divine goodness, in comparison to the act of divine love, does not have the character of end: otherwise divine goodness would exercise some causality over the divine act, and so something in God would be caused — which it is impious to say. Therefore something good is with respect to something for which it is not an end.

On the contrary, that the end and the good are the same can be persuaded first because it is supposed by Aristotle (*Physics* II, cap.3, text 31, and *Ethics* I, cap.1). Then, because since the good is what all things desire, every good must have the force to draw appetite — and whatever draws appetite claims the character of end: because the causality of the end, as we showed in

the second book of the *Physics*, consists in that metaphorical motion by which appetite is moved.

Article II: Solution of the question and explanation of the arguments.

It is to be noted that the question can be posed in two ways: namely whether the Good and End are the same formally — so that their formal reason is identical — or with respect to reciprocal foundation, so that nothing is good that does not also attain the character of end and conversely.

First assertion: The Good and the End are not formally the same. This is proved by the first argument of the preceding article.

Second assertion: The Good and the End, in whatever way they are taken, are not the same with respect to the reciprocal foundation with regard to God — if we speak of the divine internal actions. This is demonstrated by the second argument of that article.

Third assertion: The Good in act and the End in act, with respect to creatures, are not the same as regards reciprocal foundation; yet in some way they are the same if taken according to potency. The prior part of this assertion is shown from the fact that, although everything that is actually the end of a created thing is actually good (since nothing moves by that metaphorical motion we spoke of except what is good and suitable), yet not everything that is actually good is also actually the end — as is clear in gold, which is not sought after or desired by the person who despises it, and so has not the character of end with

respect to him, though it is in itself actually something good.

Question II

Whether it belongs to all things or to intellectual nature alone to act for an end?

Article I: Arguments of the negative part.

First: that it does not belong to all intellectual nature to act for an end seems easily concluded. For human beings do many things without deliberation, which they therefore do not do for the sake of any end. Second: the intuitive cognition of the divine essence is not for the sake of an end, since it is itself the ultimate end of intellectual creatures. Third: if every human operation were for the sake of an end, no human action would be idle — since idle is what lacks an end; yet it cannot be denied that many words and deeds are idle.

Fourth: that not intellectual nature alone acts for an end is shown because Aristotle, in the second book of the *Physics*, with the common assent of Philosophers and confirmed by many arguments, teaches that all corporeal nature operates for the sake of an end.

Article II: Resolution of the controversy.

First conclusion: If acting for an end is taken absolutely, all agents act for an end. Proof: Because all agents, while they operate, intend some good, toward which they are directed either by themselves or by the author of nature; and to operate in this way is to operate for an end. Second: since many causes are essentially subordinated to one another, if the causality of the first is removed, the causalities of the others must also be removed — but the end is the first among all causes, to which the others are essentially subordinated: therefore unless the end moves, there will be no motion or operation of the efficient cause. From which it follows: *All actions of agents are for the sake of an end.*

Second conclusion: To act for an end by directing oneself to it is proper to intellectual nature. This is clear from the fact that to direct oneself is the nature of that which acts by choice and deliberation — which belongs to and to those alone that are endowed with the power of understanding and desiring. Hence the other things are said to tend toward the end as directed by another — whether they are carried toward it with some cognition going before, like beasts; or with none, like trees and elements. These things tend toward the end impelled by the first mover — that is, by God — in the way an arrow is carried toward the target directed by the archer. For just as the arrow receives an impulse for hitting the target from the one who shoots it, so natural agents obtain from God — by whom they receive their forms and the force for their proper motions — a

propensity toward their ends. Hence the work of nature is called the work of intelligence. This inclination in divine letters is signified by the name of *weight*, when it is said in Wisdom 11 that God arranged all things *in weight* — as St. Augustine explains (*On Genesis* IV, cap.3). To which pertains that saying of the same Augustine (*Confessions* XIII, cap.9): *My love is my weight; wherever I am carried, I am carried by it.*

Question III

Whether there is some ultimate end of human actions, or not?

Article I: Dissolution of the question.

First conclusion: In any genus of human actions, some ultimate end must be given. This is handed down by Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* I, cap.3; *Physics* VII, cap.3 and VIII, cap.5; *Metaphysics* II, cap.2; *Ethics* I, cap.7). It is proved from the fact that just as in movers ordered per se — those whose causality depends on another — a regress to infinity cannot be given, but it is necessary to arrive at some first, otherwise there would be no motion: so in ends one must stop at some ultimate, which is the first mover finally — in which appetite comes to rest; otherwise there would be no appetite.

From this St. Thomas (*Summa* I-II, q.1, art.4) also gathers that some first medium must necessarily be given. For just as intention must be fixed in some ultimate end from which the will begins to be moved, so some first medium must be given from which execution begins — otherwise it would never begin.

Second conclusion: Every appetite tends toward the ultimate end and the supreme good. This is asserted by Aristotle (*Ethics* I, cap.7) where he says that all things desired by us are desired for the sake of happiness. It is also the teaching of St. Augustine (*On the Trinity* X, cap.6, and XIII, cap.5) and Boethius (*Consolation of Philosophy* III, prose 2) and St. Thomas with the Master of Sentences (in IV, d.49, q.1, art.5; I and III *Contra Gentiles* from cap.7).

It is persuaded from the fact that whatever is desired is desired only under the character of some good: therefore either such good is wholly perfect — and so it is the ultimate end — or it is not wholly perfect, and so it is desired in order toward the perfect. (For the beginning of anything is always ordered toward its perfection.) Now it is clear that what is imperfect — both in natural things and in artifacts — is an inchoation of the perfect.

DISPUTATION III: ON HAPPINESS

Question I:

Whether Happiness consists in external goods?

Article I: What arguments seem to show that it consists in them.

In this dispute, it is to be known first of all that beatitude is nothing other than the supreme good of the human being — which Boethius (*Consolation* III, prose 2) defines as "the state perfect by the aggregation of all goods," and Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* III) as "a complex of goods heaped up, free from all evils." On no matter was there a greater variety of dogmas among Philosophers than concerning human happiness: as Aristotle (*Ethics* I and X), Lactantius, St. Ambrose, Clement, Eusebius, and St. Augustine testify (the latter noting that M. Varro had collected 288 opinions that could be the opinions of Philosophers on Beatitude).

Since it is agreed among all that the happiness of the human being is a good, the question arises in what good it consists. Now since there are three genera of goods — external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul — we will briefly run through these three to adjudicate the controversy. The principal external goods are riches, power, honor, and glory.

First argument: Happiness is the state perfect by the aggregation of all goods; now this state is obtained chiefly by riches — since, as Aristotle (*Ethics* V, cap.5) teaches, all things are obtained by money; and as it is said in *Ecclesiastes* 10: *Money obeys all things.*

Second argument: That it consists in power and dominion is persuaded. For happiness consists in that by which human beings most closely approach the likeness of God — which is certainly obtained by the intervention of power and governance.

Third argument: That it consists in glory or honor is shown. For it seems to consist in what is most ardently desired by human beings — and such is glory or honor, as Cicero testifies: *We are all drawn by love of praise, and the best man is most led by glory.*

Article II: The negative part of the question is true.

For the four-part variety of external goods, we establish four conclusions.

First conclusion: The supreme good of the human being is not subject to fortune. For goods of fortune, such as riches, come without the study of reason; but the supreme good of the human being ought to be attained only through reason, which holds the more important place in the human being.

Second conclusion: Happiness does not consist in power. Proved: because human power is unstable and not subject to the human will; it comes to both good and bad alike. Moreover, any person can use it in either

direction, well or badly. Also, power and dominion are attended by hatred and arrogance.

Third conclusion: Happiness does not consist in honor. Proved: because beatitude ought to be in the one who is blessed — but honor is in the one who exhibits honor, not in the one to whom it is exhibited. Also, honor is rendered on account of some excellence, and is a kind of testimony of it.

Fourth conclusion: Happiness does not consist in glory or fame. Proved: for happiness must be a solid and genuine good — but it often happens that glory and fame are counterfeit, gathered from false rumors of the people.

Question II:

Whether happiness consists in goods of the body?

Article I: Arguments for the affirmative part.

The chief goods of the body are the pleasures of the senses, health, beauty, and strength.

First argument: That happiness consists in pleasure is shown because pleasure is desired for itself — as Aristotle (*Ethics* X, cap.2) testifies, saying it is

ridiculous to ask someone why he wants to feel pleasure. Therefore happiness is in pleasure.

Second argument: That which preserves the very being and life of the human being is the supreme good of the human being. But health preserves the very being and life of the human being. Therefore health is the supreme good of the human being.

Third argument: That beatitude should be placed in beauty is shown: because beauty — defined as the fitting composition of members with the sweetness of color — seems to be the chief ornament of the human being, so much so that a pre-eminent form is by common vote judged worthy of power, and the grace of the body renders virtue itself more weighty and lovable; as a Latin Poet signified with that verse: *Virtue comes more graceful in a beautiful body.*

Article II: The negative part is established.

Conclusion: Happiness does not consist in goods of the body. This is shown by the following arguments.

First: The being of the human being is contained in soul and body, and the being of the body depends on the soul; and the body itself is for the soul, as matter for form and instruments for the mover. Therefore all goods of the body are contributed to goods of the soul as to their end.

Second: The supreme good of the human being cannot be common to human beings and beasts. But the

goods of the body are thus common. Therefore human happiness does not consist in them.

Third: Many animals lacking reason excel the human being in goods of the body. Therefore if happiness were constituted in goods of the body, the human being would not surpass other animals in dignity of end.

Fourth: The highest happiness excludes all shame of baseness and misery. But goods of the body can be found together with the baseness and infamy of vices.

Article III: In particular, that happiness is not in pleasure.

On pleasure particularly it is to be noted that various philosophical opinions about it have existed. Some said it was evil; others, neither good nor bad; others, good — and of these, some placed happiness in it. Among those who placed happiness in pleasure: some placed it in the pleasure of the soul, which arises from the contemplation of things and the exercise of virtues; others in both pleasures, of soul and body alike, and in freedom from pain and troubles. And thus Epicurus is said to have held, according to Torquatus in Cicero's second book *On Ends*.

This error, insofar as it takes pleasure as what pertains to the body — in which way it touches the present dispute — is refuted both by all those arguments by which it was shown that happiness is not constituted in goods of the body; and in particular by that

argument which Aristotle adduces (*Ethics* VII, cap.11) — namely, that pleasures of the body impede prudence; and the more vehement they are, the denser a fog they pour upon the mind, occupy the citadel of reason and judgment, draw the soul into servitude of enticements, and so diminish it that nothing great or excellent is attempted. Hence that saying of Seneca (*On the Happy Life*, cap.7): *You will find Pleasure more often hiding in darkness, captive around the soft and enervating baths and perspiration chambers, soaked in ointment, pale, darkened, swathed in cosmetics.*

Question III:

Whether beatitude consists in an operation of the soul?

Article I: The affirmative part is established.

Since happiness must reside in the one who is called happy, and from the superior discussion it is clear that happiness is not in goods of the body, it follows that it is situated in goods of the soul. Moreover, since the goods of the soul, speaking generally, are powers, habits, and operations — and the two prior are ordered to operation, while happiness is desired for its own sake — it must be asserted that happiness consists in the operation of the soul. This is also taught by Aristotle (*Ethics* I, cap.7; X, cap.6; *Politics* II, cap.3; *Magna Moralia* II, cap.10).

Article II: In what operation happiness is situated?

To teach in what operation beatitude consists, it must be noted that beatitude is twofold: supernatural and natural. Each of these in turn is bipartite: supernatural beatitude into that which belongs to this mortal life, and that which belongs to the other life; and natural beatitude into speculative and practical.

Supernatural beatitude, which is obtained in the other life, consists in the intuitive contemplation of the divine nature: as St. Thomas holds (*Contra Gentiles* III, caps. 25 and 26, and *Quodlibet* 8, art.19) and his followers in various places — against Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Aegidius, and others who hold that this beatitude consists also in the act of loving God clearly seen.

The position of St. Thomas — which his supporters confirm with many arguments — can be briefly shown thus: Formal beatitude is nothing other than the attainment and possession of the ultimate end; and only the clear vision of God claims this for itself. Therefore it alone is beatitude.

Now natural happiness of this life is twofold: practical, which is the end of the active life; and contemplative, which is the end of the contemplative life. Practical happiness — since it must necessarily consist in the operation of the practical life — consists in operation according to moral virtue,

especially prudence, which is the rule of the virtues and holds the principate among them. Contemplative happiness is situated in contemplation — especially of God and of other substances free from matter: since this is the most noble operation of the speculative intellect.

Article III: The definition of happiness handed down by Aristotle is explained.

From these things it will not be difficult to understand the definition of Happiness handed down by Aristotle (*Ethics* I, cap.7): *Happiness is the operation of the soul through reason, or not without reason, according to virtue in a perfect life.*

It is called "the operation of the soul through reason or intellect" — that is, operation put forth by the intellectual power; or "not without reason" — that is, prescribed and regulated by intellect: since human actions are either put forth by the intellect itself, or by other powers which the intellect rules and governs. It is said "according to virtue" because the action in which happiness is placed must be studious and consonant with right reason. Lastly, "in a perfect life" is added: because just as one swallow does not make spring, so neither does one day or one action make a human being happy; and so that he who is called happy, he ought to exercise that action in which beatitude consists throughout the whole course of life, or for a long time.

Question IV:

Whether external goods are required for happiness?

Article I: Diverse opinions of the Philosophers.

There is a disagreement here between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. The Stoics defend the negative part most sharply, calling the Peripatetic happiness — which calls upon external goods — soft and enervated. To this view Cicero inclines in many passages, and Seneca the Stoic.

Article II: The opinion of Aristotle and its confirmation.

Yet the true view — Aristotle (*Ethics* I, cap.8) — is that for happiness: not any kind, but the happiness of the political human being who lives in the light of the Republic, external goods are required as instruments for defending the Republic, for exercising beneficence, for repelling injuries, and for other duties of that kind. This view is true: for no one would call happy in the external and political sense the one who is destitute of the goods needed to render these services — though without them any private person, considered in himself, can obtain both contemplative and practical happiness.

DISPUTATION IV: ON THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN ACTS — WILL, INTELLECT, AND SENSITIVE APPETITE

Since the chief consideration of Moral Science turns on human acts — by which the happiness of the human being is obtained, or in which it consists — the rationale of the doctrine demands that, after having treated of happiness, we dispute on human acts, and first on their principles: Will, Intellect, and Sensitive Appetite.

Question I:

Whether all human acts proceed from free will?

Article I: Arguments for the negative part.

First argument: The acts by which the souls of the blessed clearly see the divine essence, and love it as seen, are human — since in them consists the supernatural beatitude of the human being — yet by the common opinion of theologians they are not free but necessary. Therefore not all human acts proceed from free will.

Second argument: The acts that dreaming persons and the mentally deranged perform, while they dispute and reason — and also sudden acts of will and intellect — are human, since they belong to the human being alone; yet they are not free.

Third argument: Many acts administered by appetite and external members are human — since they take on moral goodness or evil — yet they are not from the will, since the acts of the will are immanent.

Article II: Explanation of the controversy.

For the satisfaction of the proposed question, certain things are to be noted. The first is: that an act can be called human in two ways: namely either as regards its substance and entity — in which way all and only the operations that emanate from the powers proper to the human being as human being are called human, such as reasoning and weeping — or as regards the mode of operating. Now the mode proper to the human being, as distinct from beasts, is to act in such a way as to have dominion and freedom over his actions (for brutes operate by natural impulse, and are acted upon as much as they act, as St. John of Damascus says in the second book *On the Orthodox Faith*, cap.27). Thus in the posterior sense only those actions are called human which the human being has in his free power.

Secondly, it is to be noted that the will is not called free or deliberate because it itself deliberates (for deliberation pertains more to the intellect than to the will) but because it follows the deliberation of the intellect. Hence that action is said to proceed from free will which is elicited or commanded by the will following the deliberation of the intellect.

With this established, we respond that all human acts proceed from the free will of the human being. For formal freedom belongs to the will alone, though the root of freedom is in the intellect.

Question II:

Whether the will moves the intellect, or the intellect moves the will?

Article I: Statement of the difficulty.

To move a faculty of the soul by something is nothing other than to lead it from potency to act. Now since a faculty can be in potency in two ways — either as regards eliciting or not eliciting an action (which is called being in potency as regards the exercise of the act) or as regards acting in this or that way (which is called being in potency as regards the specification of the act) — it follows that the said faculty needs a mover in two ways: one as regards the exercise of the act, another as regards its determination to a certain species.

First conclusion: The will moves the intellect as regards the exercise of the act, as it moves all other powers as regards human acts. This is briefly shown from the fact that the principle of the act of any active power is from the end; but the end of the acts of the intellect is contained under the end of the will: therefore the intellect must be moved by the will to elicit its acts.

Second conclusion: The intellect moves the will as regards the specification of the act. This is persuaded: because the intellect proposes to the will the object from which — as from an external formal principle — the acts of the will take their species.

Question III:

Whether the will moves all other powers to the exercise of their acts?

Article I: The affirmative part is established.

It must be maintained that the will moves the other powers of the soul — which by their own nature are subject to its command — to the exercise of their acts. This assertion is handed down by St. Augustine (*On the City of God* XII, cap.6), St. John of Damascus (*On the Orthodox Faith* II, cap.16), St. Anselm (*On the Conception*), Virgil (cap.4), St. Thomas (I, q.82, art.4) and others.

Its truth is confirmed, first by experience — since we contemplate, read, move about, and perform other such duties *when we will*; then by reason: since the principle of the act of any active power is from the end; and the good in common, which has the character of end, is the object of the will. Therefore it follows that the will moves all other powers to the exercise of their acts.

The will moves other powers by concurring with them as a more universal cause: so that from the power with which the will concurs, and from the will itself, there is made one integral cause from which one and the same numerical action proceeds.

Question IV:

Whether the sensitive appetite moves the will?

Article I: Solution of the question.

First statement: It cannot be denied that the appetite moves the will. This is confirmed first by testimonies of Sacred Scripture: *I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind* (Romans 7); and *Each person is tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and enticed* (James 1). And it is confirmed by experience.

Second statement: The appetite does not move the will by commanding it. Its truth is plain: since it is agreed among all that an inferior faculty fixed in a bodily organ cannot have command or dominion over a superior and immaterial power. Hence the will cannot be driven by a direct motion from the appetite.

Third statement: The appetite moves the will from the side of the object — that is, through the cognition of the intellect, which proposes the object to be embraced or avoided. This happens in two ways: one, because the passion of appetite is the cause of the intellect's judging in this or that way, differently, about the matter — whence that of Aristotle (*Ethics* III, cap.5): *Such as each person is, such does the end appear to*

him. The other, because the appetite moves the will through the cognition of the internal sense, which the appetite itself follows, insofar as the phantasms of the senses determine the intellect to the conception of this or that thing.

DISPUTATION V: ON THE GOODNESS AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENERAL

We have treated of the principles of human acts; now we will discourse on human acts themselves — not absolutely (for that is not the consideration of the Moral Philosopher) but as regards their goodness and evil, insofar as they touch human happiness, either promoting us toward it or impeding us from its attainment.

Question I:

Whether the goodness and evil of human actions are to be sought from the object, or not?

Article I: Explanation of the controversy.

In the proposed question, this assertion is to be established: *The goodness and evil of human actions is taken from the object.* Proved: for human actions are referred to the object as to the measure of their being, and as to an extrinsic formal cause — from which, therefore, they take their species and distinction.

By "object" we understand here the matter about which the action turns — such as money, toward which desire tends. Since here we treat of moral goodness and evil, this matter is to be viewed not according to its natural being absolutely, but as it agrees with or departs from right reason and divine law.

Goodness and evil are essential differences of human actions. For actions take goodness and evil from objects toward which they are referred by a relation that is intrinsic and essential to them. Also: good and evil are essential differences of habits — but the difference of habits is the difference of actions

proceeding from habits, as Aristotle teaches (*Ethics* II, cap.1), since similar habits produce similar acts; therefore good and evil are essential differences of human actions.

Question II:

Whether the goodness and evil of human actions also depend on circumstances?

Article I: What and how many are the circumstances of human actions.

The circumstances of human actions are said to be what stand around human actions as having themselves extrinsically to their substance or essence. These circumstances are enumerated by St. Basil, Boethius, Cicero, and St. Thomas, and Aristotle (*Ethics* III, cap.1) comprises them all in this verse: *Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.*

Who signifies the accidents of the person acting. *What* signifies not the very substance of the act (for the act cannot be a circumstance of itself) but the accidents of the effect produced. *Where* signifies the accidents of place. *By what aids* — that is, by what instruments or means. *Why* — that is, for what end. *How* signifies

the mode of the action. *When* signifies the accidents of time.

Article II: Response to the proposed question.

From what has been said it will be easy for anyone to understand what should be responded to the question raised at the outset: namely, that the goodness and evil of human actions also depend on circumstances, since these are wont to increase and diminish goodness and evil, and sometimes to draw them to a different species.

DISPUTATION VI: ON THE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL, WHICH ARE CALLED PASSIONS

The rationale of doctrine demands that before the treatment of the Virtues, we discourse on the passions. For since certain of the moral virtues inhere in the sensitive appetite, and are concerned with moderating and restraining its affections, without the knowledge of these the nature and force of virtues cannot be conveniently explained.

Question I:

Whether the sensitive appetite is rightly divided into the concupiscible and the irascible?

Article I: Arguments that seem to show it is not rightly divided.

First argument: The appetites are distinguished by their affections — but the affections attributed to the irascible appetite belong to the concupiscible. The minor is proved because, as Cicero teaches (*Tusculan Disputations* IV), hatred is inveterate anger; and as St. John of Damascus and St. Gregory of Nyssa affirm, anger consists of sadness. Since sadness and hatred belong to the concupiscible appetite, it follows that anger — which they ascribe to the irascible — is found in the concupiscible.

Second argument: In natural things, bodies are carried by one and the same weight toward their native seat and resist what impedes their motion. Therefore, by similar reasoning, one and the same appetite will be inclined both toward noxious things to be fled and toward suitable things to be pursued.

Third argument: The sensitive appetite presupposes apprehension — and the same faculty apprehends both the noxious and the suitable. Therefore the same faculty of desire will be carried toward each.

Fourth argument: In the rational part of the human being there is given only one appetite, namely the will. Therefore in the sensitive part also only one appetite will be given.

Article II: Explanation of the controversy.

Conclusion: The sensitive appetite is rightly divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as into two really distinct powers.

This is proved by St. Thomas (I, q.81, art.2): because just as in other natural things subject to corruption, there is not only an inclination and force for pursuing what is suitable to them and fleeing what is adverse, but also for resisting contraries — as is evident in fire, which not only has the propensity and virtue to leave a lower location and reach a higher, but also has heat to resist things that threaten its harm — so it is fitting that in the sensitive part there be given a twofold desiring force: one by which the animal is simply inclined to pursue what is suitable according to sense and to avoid what is noxious — and this is called the *concupiscible*; another by which it endures adversities and struggles against those that remove what is useful and beneficial or in any way inflict harm — and this is called the *irascible*. This differs from the prior in that that tends toward sensible good absolutely, while this

tends toward sensible good insofar as it is difficult and arduous: not that it desires the difficulty itself, but rather the utility that redounds into the concupiscible, insofar as by the work and ministry of the irascible the obstacles and difficulties are removed that prevent the attainment of the desired good.

Question II

Whether each sensitive appetite has its seat in the heart?

The principal opinion here — that both appetites have their seat in the heart — is held by Hippocrates, Zeno, Posidonius, Chrysippus, and other members of their school; and also Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other Peripatetics. This is proved because every affection — whether of anger or of desire — arouses disturbance in the heart, and is there felt first; and also because the heart is by the common consent of Philosophers the origin and source of all vital operations.

However, it must be known that both appetites do not reside in the same part of the heart, but in somewhat separate locations, on account of the diverse composition that anger and desire require — for anger delights in abundance of heat and dryness, desire in abundance of moisture and heat.

Question III

Whether the definition of passion is correctly framed?

Article I:

Passion is defined by Philosophers: *A motion of the sensitive appetite, arising from the apprehension of good or evil, with some non-natural change of the body.*

Now passion is taken in three ways: in one way for the reception of any thing, whether through it what suffers casts something off or not (in which usage St. Dionysius writes that the most holy man Hierotheus learned by divine suffering); second, for the reception of any thing with the casting off of another; third, for the reception of any thing with the expulsion of what was suited to the nature of what suffers — which is the proper and genuine reception. For what is properly said to suffer is what is led from a disposition according to nature to one not according to nature.

Among all the acts of the powers — both of those that know and those that desire — those alone that pertain to the sensitive appetite by their own nature always come to be with some change of the body that throws the animal off from its natural disposition.

The reason is that these acts alone are directly and per se followed by the excitation or remission of motion by which the heart dilates or contracts.

Question IV

Whether passions fall upon the mind of the wise person?

Article I: Opinions of the Philosophers.

The Stoics defended the negative part of this question, contending that the person who is truly wise ought to be free from all passions of the soul. In place of these they held three *eupatheia* (which Cicero in *Tusculan Disputations* IV called "constancies"): namely, in place of desire, volition; in place of joy, gladness; in place of fear, caution. For grief or pain, they denied there could be anything in the mind of the wise person.

The Stoics were led to this opinion because they judged it unworthy of the wise person to be shaken by disturbances — since these are diseases of the mind.

Article II: Explanation of the true opinion.

Yet it cannot be denied that passions fall even on those adorned with the ornaments of true wisdom and great virtues — since they come naturally, and

since if we set reason as their mistress (to which they yield with civil obedience), they can be brought to moderation and temperance, and can be recalled to the duties of virtue and merit praise and reward.

If the Stoics' dogma is so understood that they establish every motion of appetite to be vicious and alien to virtue, it undoubtedly conflicts with the truth of heavenly discipline: as the same holy Doctor St. Augustine (*On the City of God* XIV, cap.9) confirms with many testimonies of Sacred Scripture.

Question V:

Whether the passions of the soul are rightly enumerated by the Philosophers?

Article I: Solution of the question.

Plato in the *Theaetetus* affirms that those passions that have a name are many; those that lack a name, innumerable.

Those who distributed passion in common by a fitter method gathered it into four chief ones: namely, into joy and sadness, hope and fear. Which division St. Augustine (*On the City of God* XIV, cap.3), St. Jerome (commentary on Ezekiel I, cap.1), Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* IV), and Boethius (*Consolation of Philosophy* I, poem 7) hand down:

Drive away joys, drive away fear and hope, and let pain be absent.

And Virgil (*Aeneid* VI): *Hence they fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice.*

These four passions are compared to the four principal winds: because as these disturb the sea with

storms, so those disturb the mind with turbulent motions.

The passions are said to be principally four because they are in a sense the complement or end of the others; therefore all others follow them, as Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.1) teaches.

Article II: Division of passion into its lesser species.

If we wish to divide the genus of passions into their species more minutely, we find eleven. Of the passions of the concupiscible: six, three with respect to good and three with respect to evil. For when a good thing is presented, first love of it is aroused in the concupiscible; if the thing is absent, desire arises; if present, delight or joy. Similarly when a thing presented under the character of evil, first hatred arises; if the thing we hate is absent, flight arises; if it is present, sadness or pain arises. Of the irascible: five, two with respect to good and three with respect to evil. For if a thing is presented under the character of arduous good, hope arises at once in the irascible if one judges one can attain it; if one thinks one cannot attain it, despair arises. Now of the three passions of the irascible with respect to arduous evil: if the evil is not present, fear or daring arises — fear if we dread and flee it, daring if we attack it. If it is present, anger arises, by which the mind is inflamed to take revenge and to repel the present evil.

DISPUTATION VII: ON THE VIRTUES IN GENERAL

What remains is for us to discourse on the Virtues — first on them in general, then individually. Which disputation is preeminently important in Moral Philosophy: because by virtues we are made good, and from them there remain studious actions — without which happiness, which is the goal of moral discipline, cannot be obtained.

Question I:

Whether the definition of Virtue is correctly stated?

Article I: Explanation of the doubt.

Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.5) defines moral virtue as follows: *Virtue is an elective habit consisting in the mean, defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it.* Since this definition is proper to the present purpose, it must be explained by us carefully.

Virtue is first called a *habit*, because virtue (even taking its name broadly) is the disposition of the perfect, as Aristotle (*Physics* VII, cap.13, text 17) taught. We need habits of virtue especially for three things: First, for uniformity of actions — for those lacking habitual propensity for acting are unstable and easily changed. Second, so that action may be prompt — whence Aristotle (*Ethics* III, cap.8) says that *spontaneous acts come from habit.* Third, so that action may be performed with pleasure — which a habit provides.

It is further called *elective* — that is, operating through election — so as to exclude science and other intellectual habits. The addition *consisting in the mean* is so as to exclude vicious habits, which fall short of the mean. Finally the phrase *defined by reason as the prudent person would define it* is added so that we understand the mean in which virtue consists ought not to be the mean of the thing itself (except by accident) but relative to the subject, and from the judgment of the prudent person.

Article II: That virtue from its intrinsic reason is a good habit.

The Peripatetic and true opinion, which holds that virtue from its own nature is a good habit — and that one and the same habit cannot alternately be a virtue and a vice — is defended by St. Thomas (I-II, q.55, art.1 and 4), Gabriel (in III, d.23, q.1, art.1), and others.

Scotus holds the contrary, asserting that an identical habit can alternately be a virtue and a vice — since virtue, he says, formally consists in a relation of conformity to right reason founded in the habit; and the habit itself is by its nature indifferent to good and evil.

The truth of the Peripatetic opinion is proved: first, because Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.5), inquiring into the genus of virtue, concludes it is a habit; and in the same book (cap.8) teaches that virtue and vice are contraries to each other. Moreover, virtue from itself — as Aristotle defined — is an elective habit consisting in the mean; therefore virtue from its own nature inclines to a good act, and in no way to an act that recedes from the mean defined by the judgment of prudence. And so virtue from its intrinsic reason is a good habit.

Question II:

Whether moral virtue consists in the mean?

Article I: On the double mean of virtue; and in what mean every virtue is placed.

We asserted that moral virtue is placed in the mean together with Aristotle in the definition of virtue. That this is not to be taken as if for the character of virtue it were required that it hit upon the said mean at an indivisible point — as the Stoics falsely thought — but that it is constituted in the maximum, that is, in the attainment of that individual mean, and therefore judged no one endowed with virtue unless disposed to perform studious actions in the highest degree.

The Peripatetic and true view — as is clear from what Aristotle hands down in *Ethics* II — decides that there is latitude in the mean of virtue; and that the very object of virtue can be attained now in a more perfect, now in a less perfect way.

First assertion: Every moral virtue (under which name we do not here include prudence) consists in the mean as regards the object. This is taught by Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.6 and V, caps.3 and 4). It is persuaded

because the good of what is ruled and measured is situated in adequation to its rule. Therefore since the good of moral virtue is directed by reason, it will surely be situated in adequation to the measure of reason — which adequation is an equality or commensuration between excess and defect, that is, the mean.

Second assertion: All moral virtues except Justice consist in the mean as regards essence — that is, they are placed between two vicious habits. This is clear by induction: for fortitude is between the vice of timidity and the vice of rashness; liberality between avarice and prodigality; and similarly for the rest.

Article II: On the meana of Justice.

We excepted Justice, because it is peculiar to it not to be placed between two extreme vices. For Justice is exercised between more and less, which is contrary to right. Those who give more than their own commit no sin of injustice, or if they commit some, it does not pertain to injustice but to prodigality. Hence Justice has only one extreme, namely injustice — because the said more and less always produces injustice.

Question III:

Whether virtues are natural to the human being, or are acquired by one's own acts?

Article I: Virtues in one sense are natural to the human being; in another sense they are not.

First assertion: Virtues are natural to the human being in the first mode. Proved: because the human being by his own nature is a participant in reason, and it is natural for him to live according to reason, as St. Dionysius teaches. Since the actions of virtues are consonant with right reason, it follows that they are fitting to human nature.

Second assertion: Virtues are not natural to the human being in the posterior mode. This is handed down by Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.1). It is persuaded because if virtues were natural in this way, no one would merit praise for them, since no one is rightly praised except for a free act. Also, human beings could not become accustomed to vices: since (as Aristotle teaches in the first book of *Magna Moralia*, cap.6) contrary habituation accomplishes nothing with respect to what is implanted by nature in that way.

Article II: Acquired virtues are compared through our acts.

Third assertion: Acquired virtues are compared through our acts. Active operating principles that are fitting to nature, which are not in us by nature but by acquisition, are compared through our acts — and the acquired virtues are active operating principles of this kind. The major is clear from Aristotle's doctrine (*Ethics* II) — for this is the difference between innate and acquired principles: that innate principles precede acts and are not compared through them; but acquired principles follow acts and are obtained by them.

Question IV:

Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

Article I: Arguments of the negative part.

The question is not raised about intellectual virtues — for it is certain that these are not necessarily connected with one another.

The controversy is to be understood of moral virtues; in such a way, however, that the name of moral virtue here also includes prudence, though it belongs to the intellect.

Scotus, Gabriel, Ockham, and Almain hold that virtues of this kind are not connected with one another. Their view seems to be shown by these arguments:

First: Moral virtues are acquired by exercise; but it is established that many exercise themselves in the matter of certain virtues and not of others — therefore they will compare only those virtues in which they exercise themselves, not all.

Second: It is established that many cannot attain certain virtues — since no one exercises the act of

munificence except in great wealth, since this virtue turns on great expenditures.

Article II: The affirmative part of the question is concluded.

The contrary view must be embraced. This is proved as follows:

First argument: Perfect liberality restrains the desire for money in every situation; otherwise it would not be perfect. But this it cannot do without the assistance of the other virtues. Therefore perfect liberality requires the conjunction of the other virtues. For if someone from one side is threatened with death, and from the other with money to commit an injustice against the fatherland — unless fortified with the virtue of fortitude for despising death, and justice for not inflicting injury, he will easily succumb to the desire for money.

Second argument: Perfect moral virtue requires perfect prudence; and perfect prudence cannot exist without the other virtues. Therefore all virtues are bound together by the common bond of prudence. The major is clear both from the doctrine of Aristotle (*Ethics* VI, ult.) and from the very definition of virtue — where virtue is said to consist in the mean, as the prudent person would define it. And what confirms it: perfect prudence is not sufficient if about one matter alone, but must be perfect and complete, and therefore about all matters.

Question V

Whether there are any virtues in the sensitive appetite?

Scotus holds two statements. The first: that fortitude and temperance, as they are properly and simply moral virtues, reside in the will. The second: that there are in the appetite — both irascible and concupiscible — certain habits by which they are rightly disposed concerning the matter of fortitude and temperance: which habits, however, do not attain the dignity of virtue.

Article II: The opinion of St. Thomas and his followers is defended.

St. Thomas (I-II, q.56, art.4) and Cajetan: *Fortitude and temperance inhere not in the will but in the sensitive appetite.* This assertion is confirmed first by the testimony of Aristotle, who (*Ethics* III, cap.10) says that fortitude and temperance belong to the irrational parts of the soul — that is, pertain to the sensitive appetite — and in book II, cap.3, proves from scratch that these virtues turn on the moderation of pleasures and pains, which are affections of the sensitive appetite.

The prior part of the assertion is based in St. Thomas on the fact that no power needs any quality by which it is inclined toward what it is naturally already prone to — as the will is prone to the good in common and to any particular good proportionate to the subject desiring it. Since therefore the rational good that is seen in restraining the passions of the sensitive appetite is a good of the natural order, proper to the subject desiring it, it follows that the will needs no habit to be carried toward such good — but the sensitive appetite does need one, since by its own nature it does not tend toward rational good (which exceeds its measure and capacity) but toward the delectable good.

Question VI:

Is the division of virtues apt, or not?

Article I: On the division of virtue into intellectual and moral.

Virtue in its total scope — both acquired and infused; both moral and intellectual — is defined in the common mode: *Virtue is an operative habit of the good.* Intellectual virtue specifically: *Intellectual virtue is an operative habit of the good, residing in the intellect.* Infused virtue, as gathered from St. Augustine (*On Free Will* II, cap.8) and others: *Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, of which no one makes bad use, which God works in us without us.*

Now virtue in its total scope, as we have already noted above, is first distributed into Intellectual and Moral. The intellectual virtues reside in the intellect; the moral ones obtain their seat in the appetite. The intellectual virtues in turn are either contemplative — situated in contemplation and knowledge of truth, not regarding practice — or practical, which incline toward practice and labor in the work.

The contemplative are three, as Aristotle (*Ethics* VI, cap.3) teaches: *Intellectus* (understanding), *Scientia* (science), and *Sapientia* (wisdom). *Understanding* is the contemplative habit by which one is inclined to assent

clearly and evidently to first principles. *Science* is the contemplative habit by which one is inclined to assent firmly and evidently to necessary conclusions, not through supreme causes. *Wisdom* is the contemplative habit by which one is inclined to assent to necessary conclusions through first and supreme causes — such as is first philosophy.

The practical habits are three: *Synderesis*, *Prudence*, and *Art*. *Synderesis* is the practical habit by which one is rendered prone to assent to the first and most common moral principles — such as: *Good is to be embraced, evil is to be avoided*; and *What you wish for yourself, do to another; what you do not wish for yourself, do not do to another*. *Prudence* is right reason concerning things to be done — that is, human acts immanent in us. *Art* is right reason concerning things to be made — that is, those things that are made by action passing into external matter.

Now the four virtues called cardinal are: prudence in the intellect, justice in the will, temperance in the concupiscible appetite, fortitude in the irascible appetite. They are called cardinal because, as doors move on hinges, so all moral conduct moves on them.

Article II: On the division of virtue into acquired and infused.

Virtue taken broadly is also divided into Acquired and Infused. *Acquired virtue* is that which is compared through our acts. *Infused virtue* is that which is not acquired through our acts but is infused by God.

It must be maintained — with St. Thomas (I-II, q.63, art.3), Cajetan, Capreolus, and many others — that moral virtues that are infused per se are to be given. The truth of this view can be concluded briefly thus: Acquired moral virtues turn on the mean according to right human reason and rule, and in order toward the natural ultimate end. But in order toward the supernatural end and according to the divine rule, the mean must often be set otherwise — since many things are done with respect to supernatural beatitude that would not be done if only natural beatitude were considered. Therefore it is necessary that beyond the acquired moral virtues — which have proportion with the natural end and human rule — other infused virtues be given, distinct from them in species, which aptly and fittingly correspond to supernatural beatitude and the divine rule.

DISPUTATION VIII: ON PRUDENCE

Question I:

Whether Prudence is rightly defined by Aristotle?

Article I: The definition of Prudence is approved and explained.

Now we must discourse on the individual moral virtues; and first on Prudence, which obtains the principal place among them — both because it resides in the intellect, which is nobler than the appetite; and because it rules the rest. Hence St. Gregory (*On Ezekiel* II, hom.22) teaches that the other virtues, unless they act prudently, cannot be virtues at all.

Aristotle defined prudence by the common assent of Philosophers thus (*Ethics* VI, cap.5): *Prudence is a habit of true action with reason concerning what is good and bad for the human being.* It is called "habit of true action" — so as to denote not only speculative habits, but those ordered to action. It is called "of action" — that is, tending toward action — to exclude habits of making,

that is, those concerned with production and external work. It is added "concerning what is good or bad for the human being" — so as to remove certain habits that, though true and immanent actions, do not care about the propriety of human actions, as Dialectic does — for that is the office of prudence, which hands down the manner of living rightly and prescribes what is to be fled and what embraced.

Article II: In what manner it is to be understood that prudence is not subject to falsehood.

For the explanation of this difficulty, it is to be noted: just as the intellect is divided into speculative and practical — from which St. Thomas also (*Summa* I, q.79, art.11) has taught there to be a twofold truth: one speculative, the other practical. The former is considered in the conformity of cognition to the thing known. The latter, as it pertains to the present place, consists in the equation of reason to right appetite: which rectitude the virtues residing in it provide. From this double truth it is noted that a speculative habit is absolutely true only if it turns on a necessary object and one that cannot be otherwise; while a practical habit — although it tends toward a contingent object — can nonetheless be consonant with truth, if it is equated to right appetite; whatever may be true of the object considered in itself and in its own nature.

Question II:

Whether the acts of prudence and its parts are rightly handed down?

Article I: On the acts of prudence.

First, it must be said that prudence does not set the end for the moral virtues — for that pertains to natural reason and synderesis, which stands to prudence as the intellect of principles stands to science. Therefore the office of prudence is to decide only about means — or about those things that are *for* the end — directing the other moral virtues toward the means accommodated for obtaining their ends.

Now there are three acts pertaining to prudence: of which the first is to *counsel and inquire* for means; the second is to *judge* which among the means found are most conducive to obtaining the end; the third is to *command or prescribe* that what has been judged be performed.

The command, which is the act properly convenient to prudence itself, consists in the denunciation and intimation by which the intellect moves the will of the one commanded to acting. Whence you see that for command, the consent and efficacious election of the will is prerequired; and in turn from the intellect the will is excited, by the force of this consent and

election — since without the consent of the will the intellect would not at all impel to action.

Article II: On the integrant parts of prudence.

The integrant parts of prudence are eight, enumerated by St. Thomas (II-II, q.48): namely, *memory*, *understanding*, *docility*, *shrewdness*, *reason*, *providence*, *circumspection*, and *caution*.

Of these, the first five pertain to prudence as a habit of cognizing; and the three latter pertain to prudence insofar as it commands, applying cognition to work. *Providence* is so that it may dispose and order future things accommodated to the end. *Circumspection* is so that it may carefully and diligently attend to the circumstances of affairs. *Caution* is so that it may decline and remove impediments that can occur.

Article III: On the subjective and potential parts of prudence.

The subjective parts of prudence in common are five: solitary prudence, economic, military, regal, and political. For either one manages oneself prudently with respect to oneself — and this is called *solitary prudence*. Or one manages a multitude — and this multitude is either directed by him to some special business for a fixed time, like soldiers in war, and in governing this *military prudence* is exercised. Or the multitude under his governance is to last for the

whole time of life — and if it is a family, the prudence constituted for governing it is called *economic*; if a Republic, in the prince it is called *regal*; and in the subjects themselves it is called *political*.

The potential parts of prudence are *Eubulia*, *Synesis*, and *Gnome*. For just as there are three acts of prudence — inquiry into means, judgment about the means found, and prescription — so for these three things there are three habits: for easily finding accommodated means, *Eubulia*; for judging well about those things that are determined by some law, *Synesis*; and for passing judgment on those things not determined by any law but yet occurring in practice — in which greater difficulty arises — *Gnome*.

DISPUTATION IX: ON THE REMAINING MORAL VIRTUES

Question I: On Justice

Article I: What is Justice.

Among the virtues simply speaking moral, Justice holds the principal place — both by reason of subject and by reason of object. By reason of subject: since while the other moral virtues inhere in the sensitive appetite to moderate and restrain its disturbances, Justice itself resides in the rational appetite — that is, in the will, as Aristotle (*Ethics* V, cap.1) hands down. By reason of object: because the other moral virtues are concerned per se and from proper purpose only with the good of those in whom they are — but according to justice each person relates well also to others, providing equality to them; whence justice is also called *the good of another* by Aristotle.

Justice is defined: *Justice is the virtue that renders to each his own right.* Now right is nothing other than what is just and right — which divides into two members: natural right and positive or legitimate right. Natural right, as Aristotle (*Ethics* V, cap.7) defines it, is *what everywhere has the same force*; and *that which is necessary by its own nature everywhere, and not because it seems or does not seem to*

be, and not because it is established by someone's will or judgment — such as that the innocent shall not be struck down. Positive right is *that which is such not by its own nature but depends on some institution* — such as that grain shall be sold at such a price.

The definition of Ulpian (*Digest*, On Justice and Right) explains the nature of justice with richer words: *Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his own right.* In this definition three conditions common to all virtue are handed down — as Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.4) placed them — namely that one acts knowingly, from election, and permanently or constantly in studious action.

Articles II, III, IV cover Justice's integrant parts (doing good and declining from evil), its subjective parts (general or legal justice; particular justice distributed into distributive and commutative), its acts (the twelve acts of commutative justice), and its potential parts (religion, piety, observance, obedience, truthfulness, gratitude, liberality, affability, friendship).

Question II:

On Fortitude

Article I: What is Fortitude; what are its acts.

Fortitude is taken in two ways. In one way, as importing a certain firmness and constancy of soul for performing honorable actions. In the other way, as designating firmness of soul in undertaking dangers and enduring labors — in which way it is a special virtue, claiming as its object fear and daring that arise in the said matters. And so it is defined by Aristotle: *Fortitude is the mean-ness with respect to fear and daring* — that is, the virtue that is placed in moderating fear and daring.

The two acts of fortitude are *sustaining* and *attacking*. For since fortitude turns on daring and fear — it represses fear by sustaining with difficulty; and moderates daring by attacking. Of these two, *sustaining* is more excellent than *attacking* — as Aristotle (*Ethics* IX, cap.9) teaches. For it is more arduous to repress fear (which is done by sustaining) than to restrain daring (which is done by attacking).

Among the particular acts of fortitude, martyrdom holds the principal place. For it belongs to fortitude

to firm the soul in good against fear; and the martyr is firmed in the good of faith and religion, against the fear of the most bitter and most formidable of all things — namely death.

Article II: On the parts of fortitude.

Fortitude has principally four integrant parts: confidence or magnanimity, magnificence, patience (to which long-suffering pertains), and perseverance (to which constancy pertains). Fortitude has no subjective parts, because it turns on a very specific matter that cannot constitute several virtues distinct in species.

Question III:

On Temperance

Article I: What is temperance, and what are its integrant parts.

Just as fortitude turns principally on the dangers of death, so also temperance is placed in moderating the pleasures of the senses and pains — but principally in tempering the pleasures of touch and taste, which are the greater ones. Therefore temperance is defined by Aristotle (*Ethics* II, cap.10): *Temperance is the mean-ness*

concerning the pleasures of touch and taste, and concerning pains.

The quasi-integrant parts of temperance are two: *modesty* and *honesty*. *Modesty* — though properly it is not a virtue, since it is more similar to a passion than a habit — is nonetheless called a virtue in that sense in which anything laudable in human acts or affections is called virtue. *Honesty* is a certain excellence worthy of honor on account of spiritual beauty, by which one repels what is base and unbecoming.

The subjective parts of temperance are four: abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and modesty. *Abstinence* is the virtue that establishes the mean in the delight of foods. *Sobriety* is the virtue that moderates the pleasures of drink. *Chastity* is the virtue that restrains the desire of Venus by the moderating of reason. *Modesty* is the virtue that restrains the pleasures found in venereal signs.

The potential parts of temperance are ten: continence, meekness, clemency, modesty (of honors), humility, studiousness, moderation, eutrapelia, ornament, and simplicity.

These matters, having been set forth here briefly and in passing — if they were to be explained fully and as the dignity of the things demands, we would undoubtedly be far longer than the deliberate brevity we have elsewhere laid down, and which the reasons we have elsewhere expounded allow.

— FINIS —

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